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Abstract
This paper aims to vindicate the thesis that cognitive computational
properties are abstract objects implemented in physical systems. I avail
of the equivalence relations countenanced in Homotopy Type Theory, in
order to specify an abstraction principle for intensional, computational
properties. The homotopic abstraction principle for intensional mental
functions provides an epistemic conduit into our knowledge of cognitive
algorithms as abstract objects. I examine, then, how intensional functions
in Epistemic Modal Algebra are deployed as core models in the philosophy
of mind, Bayesian perceptual psychology, the program of natural language
semantics in linguistics, and in quantum information theory, and I argue
that this provides abductive support for the truth of homotopic abstrac-
tion. Epistemic modality can thus be shown to be both a compelling
and a materially adequate candidate for the fundamental structure of
mental representational states, comprising a fragment of the Language of
Thought.
1 Introduction
This essay aims to vindicate the thesis that cognitive computational properties
are abstract objects implemented in physical systems.1 A recent approach to
the foundations of mathematics is Homotopy Type Theory.2 In Homotopy Type
Theory, homotopies can be defined as equivalence relations on intensional func-
tions. In this essay, I argue that homotopies can thereby figure in abstraction
1Cf. Turing (1950); Putnam (1967); Newell (1973); Fodor (1975); and Pylyshyn (1978).
2Cf. The Univalent Foundations Program (2013).
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principles for intensional, cognitive computational properties.3 Homotopies for
intensional functions thus comprise identity criteria for some cognitive mech-
anisms. The philosophical significance of the foregoing is twofold. First, the
proposal demonstrates how epistemic modality is a viable candidate for a frag-
ment of the Language of Thought.4 The identity of intensional functions and
epistemic modal operators can be witnessed via a unique, epistemic interpreta-
tion of the algebraic semantics of modal logic. Second, the proposal serves to
delineate one conduit for our epistemic access to cognitive algorithms as abstract
objects.5
3For the first proposal to the effect that abstraction principles can be used to define ab-
stracta such as cardinal number, see Frege (1884/1980: 68; 1893/2013: 20). For the locus
classicus of the contemporary abstractionist program, see Hale and Wright (2001).
4See, by contrast, Stalnaker (1984), who argues that possible worlds model theory ought
to model the pragmatics of intentional states, rather than internal representations of agents,
and who argues against the existence of epistemic possibilities (2003: ch. 11). Given a
metalanguage, a precedent to the current approach – which models thoughts and internal
representations via possible worlds model theory – can be found in Wittgenstein (1921/1974:
2.15-2.151, 3-3.02).
5Bealer (1982) proffers a non-modal algebraic logic for intensional entities – i.e., properties,
relations, and propositions – which avails of a λ-definable variable-binding abstraction operator
(op. cit.: 46-48, 209-210). Bealer reduces modal notions to logically necessary conditions-cum-
properties, as defined in his non-modal algebraic logic (207-209). The present approach differs
from the foregoing by: (i) countenancing a modal algebra, on an epistemic interpretation
thereof; (ii) treating the abstraction operator as a Fregean function from concepts to objects,
rather than as a λ-operator; (iii) availing of the univalence axiom in Homotopy Type Theory
– which collapses identity and isomorphism – in order to provide an equivalence relation for
the abstraction principle pertinent to (ii); and (iv) demonstrating how the model is availed
of in various branches of the cognitive sciences, such that Epistemic Modal Algebra may be
considered a viable candidate for the Language of Thought.
Katz (1998) proffers a view of the epistemology of abstracta, according to which the propo-
sitions of the Language of Thought are abstract, and on which the syntax and the semantics
for the propositions are innate (35). Katz suggests that the proposal is consistent with both
a Fregean approach to propositions, according to which they are thoughts formed by the con-
catenation of concepts, and a Russellian approach, according to which they are structured
tuples of non-conceptual entities (36). He endorses, ultimately, an approach to propositions
which eschews Frege’s (1892/1997) distinction between sense and reference, yet according to
which they are ’abstract senses’, or thoughts, correlated to natural language sentence types
(114-115). That propositions are abstract is argued, then, to suffice for knowledge of abstract
entities (op. cit.). One difference between Katz’s proposal and the one here presented is that
Katz rejects modal approaches to propositions, because the latter cannot countenance reductio
proofs based on counterfactuals with impossible antecedents (38; cf. Lewis, 1973: I.6). Fol-
lowing, Lewis (op. cit.), the present approach does not avail of impossible worlds, i.e., worlds
at which true contradictions obtain; and thus counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are
vacuously true. If so, then Katz’s argument against modal approaches to propositions can be
circumvented. A second difference is that, on Katz’s approach, the necessity of mathematical
truths is argued to consist in reductio proofs, such that the relevant formulas will be true on
all interpretations, and thus true of logical necessity (39). However, the endeavor to reduce
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In Section 2, I provide an abstraction principle for cognitive algorithms,
by availing of the equivalence relations countenanced in Homotopy Type The-
ory. In Section 3, I define a topological boolean algebraic semantics for modal
logic, where the modalities defined on the algebra range over states of infor-
mation.6 In Section 4, I describe how models of Epistemic Modal Algebra
are availed of when perceptual representational states are modeled in Bayesian
perceptual psychology; when speech acts are modeled in natural language se-
mantics; when transformations are defined in quantum information theory; and
when knowledge, belief, intentional action, and rational intuition are modeled
in philosophical approaches to the nature of propositional attitudes. This pro-
vides abductive support for the claim that Epistemic Modal Algebra is both a
compelling and materially adequate candidate for a fragment of the Language
of Thought. In Section 5, I argue that the proposal (i) resolves objections to the
relevant abstraction principles advanced by both Dean (2016) and Linnebo and
Pettigrew (2014), and (ii) reveals a commitment to in re platonism in the ap-
peal to cognitive mechanisms in Azzouni’s (2013: 9.1-9.2; forthcoming) version
of nominalism. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
the necessity of mathematical truths to the necessity of logical consequence would result in the
preclusion, both of cases of informal proofs in mathematics, which can, e.g., involve diagrams
(cf. Azzouni, 2004; Giaquinto, 2008: 1.2), and of mathematical truths which obtain in axiom-
atizable, yet non-logical mathematical languages such as Euclidean geometry. Finally, Katz
rejects abstraction principles, and thus implicit definitions for abstract objects (105-106).
6The epistemic modality can be interpreted so as to target notions of conceivability (⋄)
and apriority ( ≡ ¬⋄¬); belief and knowledge; and psychophysical possibilities. See Section
4, for further discussion.
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2 An Abstraction Principle for Cognitive Algo-
rithms
In this section, I specify a homotopic abstraction principle for intensional func-
tions. Intensional isomorphism, as a jointly necessary and sufficient condition
for the identity of intensions, is first proposed in Carnap (1947: §14). The
isomorphism of two intensional structures is argued to consist in their logical,
or L-, equivalence, where logical equivalence is co-extensive with the notions of
both analyticity (§2) and synonymy (§15). Carnap writes that: ’[A]n expression
in S is L-equivalent to an expression in S’ if and only if the semantical rules of S
and S’ together, without the use of any knowledge about (extra-linguistic) facts,
suffice to show that the two have the same extension’ (p. 56), where semanti-
cal rules specify the intended interpretation of the constants and predicates of
the languages (4).7 The current approach differs from Carnap’s by defining the
equivalence relation necessary for an abstraction principle for epistemic inten-
sions on Voevodsky’s (2006) Univalence Axiom, which collapses identity with
isomorphism in the setting of intensional type theory.8 In the following section,
I define, then, a class of models for Epistemic Modal Algebra.
7For criticism of Carnap’s account of intensional isomorphism, based on Carnap’s (1937:
17) ’Principle of Tolerance’ to the effect that pragmatic desiderata are a permissible constraint
on one’s choice of logic, see Church (1954: 66-67).
8Note further that, by contrast to Carnap’s approach, epistemic intensions are here dis-
tinguished from linguistic intensions (cf. Khudairi (ms1,), for further discussion), and the
current work examines the philosophical significance of the convergence between epistemic
intensions and formal, rather than natural, languages. For a translation from type theory to
set theory – which is of interest to, inter alia, the definability of epistemic intensions in the
setting of set theory (cf. Khudairi (ms2, ms3, ms4,) – see Linnebo and Rayo (2012). For
topological Boolean-valued models of epistemic set theory – i.e., a variant of ZF with the ax-
ioms augmented by epistemic modal operators interpreted as informal provability and having
a background logic satisfying S4 – see Scedrov (1985), Flagg (1985), and Goodman (1990).
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Topological Semantics
In the topological semantics for modal logic, a frame is comprised of a set of
points in topological space, X, and an accessibility relation, R:
F = 〈X,R〉;
X = (Xx)x∈X ; and
R = (Rxy)x,y∈X iff Rx ⊆ Xx x Xx, s.t. if Rxy, then ∃o⊆X, with x∈o s.t.
∀y∈o(Rxy),
where the set of points accessible from a privileged node in the space is said to
be open.9 A model defined over the frame is a tuple, M = 〈F,V〉, with V a
valuation function from subsets of points in F to propositonal variables taking
the values 0 or 1. Necessity is interpreted as an interiority operator on the
space:
M,x  φ iff ∃o⊆X, with x∈o, such that ∀y∈o M,y  φ.
Homotopy Theory
Homotopy Theory countenances the following identity, inversion, and
concatenation morphisms, which are identified as continuous paths in the
topology. The formal clauses, in the remainder of this section, evince how
homotopic morphisms satisfy the properties of an equivalence relation.10
p : [0,1] → X, with p(0) = x and p(1) = y;
f : X1 → X2;
g : X1 → X2;
H : X1 x {0,1} → X2, Hx,0 = f(x) and Hx,1 = g(x).
9In order to ensure that the Kripke semantics matches the topological semantics, X must
further be Alexandrov; i.e., closed under arbitrary unions and intersections.
10The definitions and proofs at issue can be found in the Univalent Foundations Program
(op. cit.: ch. 2).
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Reflexivity
∀x,y:A∀p(p : x =A y) : τ(x,y,p), with A and τ designating types, and U
designating a universe of elements, e:
∀α:A∃e(α) : τ(α, α, refα);
p,q : (x =A y)
∃r∈e : p =(x=Ay) q
∃µ : r = (p=(x=Ay)q) s.
The Induction Principle
If:
∀x,y:A∀p(p : x =A y)∃τ [τ(x,y,p)] ∧ ∀α:A∃e(α) : τ(α, α, refα)
Then:
∀x,y:A∃p(p : x =A y)∃e[ind=A(τ ,e,x,y,p) : τ(x,y,p), such that
ind=A(τ ,e,α,α,refα) ≡ e(α)].
Symmetry
∀A∀x,y:A∃HΣ(x=y → y=x)
HΣ := p 7→ p−1, such that
∀x:A(refx ≡ refx−1).
Transitivity
∀A∀x,y:A∃HT (x=y → y=z → x=z)
HT := p 7→ q 7→ p • q, such that
∀x:A[refx • refx ≡ refx].
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Homotopic Abstraction
For all type families A,B, there is a homotopy:
H := [(f ∼ g) :≡
∏
x:A(f(x) = g(x)], where
∏
f :A→B[(f ∼ f) ∧ (f ∼ g → g ∼ f) ∧ (f ∼ g → g ∼ h → f ∼ h)],
such that, via Voevodsky’s (op. cit.) Univalence Axiom, for all type families
A,B:U, there is a function:
idtoeqv : (A =U B) → (A ≃ B),
which is itself an equivalence relation:
(A =U B) ≃ (A ≃ B).
Abstraction principles for intensional computational properties take, then,
the form:
• ∀A,B∃f,g[
∏
f :A→BAf(x) = Ag(x)] ≃ [f(x) ≃ g(x)],
with A an abstraction operator from the domain of functions to a domain
of abstract objects.
3 Epistemic Modal Algebra
In Epistemic Modal Algebra, the topological boolean algebra, A, is formed by
taking the powerset of the topological space, X, defined above; i.e., A = P(X).
The domain of A is comprised of formula-terms – eliding propositions with
names – assigned to elements of P(X), where the proposition-letters are inter-
preted as encoding states of information. The top element of the algebra is
denoted ’1’ and the bottom element is denoted ’0’. We interpret modal op-
erators, f(x), – i.e., intensional functions in the algebra – as both concerning
topological interiority, as well as reflecting epistemic possibilities. An Epistemic
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Modal-valued Algebraic structure has the form, F = 〈A, DP (X), ρ〉, where ρ is
a mapping from points in the topological space to elements or regions of the
algebraic structure; i.e., ρ : DP (X) x DP (X) → A. A model over the Epistemic-
Modal Topological Boolean Algebraic structure has the form M = 〈F, V〉, where
V(a) ≤ ρ(a) and V(a,b) ∧ ρ(a, b) ≤ V(b).11 For all xx/a,φ,y∈A:
f(1) = 1;
f(x) ≤ x;
f(x ∧ y) = f(x) ∧ f(y);
f[f(x)] = f(x);
V(a, a) > 0;
V(a, a) = 1;
V(a, b) = V(b, a);
V(a, b) ∧ V(b, c) ≤ V(a, c);
V(a = a) = ρ(a, a);
V(a, b) ≤ f[V(a, b)];
V(¬φ) = ρ(¬φ) – f(φ);
V(⋄φ) = ρφ – f[– V(φ)];
V(φ) = f[V(φ)] (cf. Lando, op. cit.).
4 Examples in Philosophy, Cognitive Science,
and Quantum Information Theory
The foregoing possible worlds model theory is availed of by a number of paradigms
in contemporary empirical theorizing: the computational theory of mind, Bayesian
perceptual psychology, natural language semantics, and the theory of quantum
11See Lando (2015); McKinsey and Tarski (1944); and Rasiowa (1963), for further details.
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information.
In Bayesian perceptual psychology, the problem of underdetermination is
resolved by availing of a gradational possible worlds model. The visual system
is presented with a set of possibilities with regard, e.g., to the direction of a
light source. So, for example, the direction of light might be originating from
above, or it might be originating from below. The visual system computes
the constancy, i.e. the likelihood that one of the possibilities is actual.12 The
computation of the perceptual constancy is an unconscious statistical inference,
as anticipated by Helmholtz’s (1878) conjecture.13 The constancy places, then, a
condition on the accuracy of the attribution of properties – such as boundedness
and volume – to distal particulars.14
In the program of natural language semantics in empirical and philosoph-
ical linguistics, the common ground or ’context set’ is the set of possibilities
presupposed by a community of speakers.15 Kratzer (1979: 121) refers to cases
in which the above possibilities are epistemic as an ’epistemic conversational
background’, where the epistemic possibilities are a subset of objective or cir-
cumstantial possibilities (op. cit.). Modal operators are then defined on the
space, encoding the effects of various speech acts in entraining updates on the
context set.16 So, e.g., assertion is argued to provide a truth-conditional update
on the context set, whereas there are operator updates, the effects of which are
not straightforwardly truth-conditional and whose semantic values must then
12Cf. Mamassian et al. (2002).
13For the history of the integration of algorithms and computational modeling into contem-
porary visual psychology, see Johnson-Laird (2004).
14Cf. Burge (2010), and Rescorla (2013), for further discussion. A distinction ought to
be drawn between unconscious perceptual representational states – as targeted in Burge (op.
cit.) – and the inquiry into whether the properties of phenomenal consciousness have accuracy-
conditions – where phenomenal properties are broadly construed, so as to include, e.g., color-
phenomenal properties, as well as the property of being aware of one’s perceptual states.
15Cf. Stalnaker (1978).
16Cf. Kratzer (op. cit.); Stalnaker (op. cit.); Lewis (1980); Heim (1992); Veltman (1996);
von Fintel and Heim (2011); and Yalcin (2012).
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be defined relative to an array of intensional parameters (including a context –
agent, time, location, et al. – and a tuple of indices).
In quantum information theory, let a constructor be a computation defined
over physical systems. Constructors entrain nomologically possible transforma-
tions from admissible input states to output states (cf. Deutsch, 2013). On this
approach, information is defined in terms of constructors, i.e., intensional com-
putational properties. The foregoing transformations, as induced by construc-
tors, are referred to as tasks. Because constructors encode the counterfactual to
the effect that, were an initial state to be computed over, then the output state
would result, modal notions are thus constitutive of the definition of the tasks
at issue. There are, further, both topological and algebraic aspects of the fore-
going modal approach to quantum computation.17 The composition of tasks is
formed by taking their union, where the union of tasks can be satisfiable while
its component tasks might not be. Suppose, e.g., that the information states at
issue concern the spin of a particle. A spin-state vector will be the sum of the
probabilities that the particle is spinning either upward or downward. Suppose
that there are two particles which can be spinning either upward or downward.
Both particles can be spinning upward; spinning downward; particle-1 can be
spinning upward while particle-2 spins downward; and vice versa. The state
vector, V which records the foregoing possibilities – i.e., the superposition of
the states – will be equal to the product of the spin-state of particle-1 and
the spin-state of particle-2. If the particles are both spinning upward or both
spinning downward, then V will be .5. However – relative to the value of each
particle vector, referred to as its eigenvalue – the probability that particle-1 will
be spinning upward is .5 and the probability that particle-2 will be spinning
17For an examination of the interaction between topos theory and an S4 modal axiomati-
zation of computable functions, see Awodey et al. (2000).
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downward is .5, such that the probability that both will be spinning upward or
downward = .5 x .5 = .25. Considered as the superposition of the two states,
V will thus be unequal to the product of their eigenvalues, and is said to be
entangled. If the indeterminacy evinced by entangled states is interpreted as
inconsistency, then the computational properties at issue might further have to
be hyperintensional.18
Finally, Epistemic Modal Algebra, as a fragment of the Language of Thought,
is able to delineate the fundamental structure of the propositional attitudes tar-
geted in 20th century philosophy; notably knowledge, belief, intentional action,
and rational propositional intuition. Khudairi (ms1) argues, e.g., that the types
of intention – acting intentionally; referring to an intention as an explanation for
one’s course of action; and intending to pursue a course of action in the future –
can be modeled as modal operators, whose semantic values are defined relative
to an array of intensional parameters. Field (2001: 85-86) argues that – because
possible worlds models of intentional states entrain logical equivalence for con-
tents that ought to be distinct – such models underdetermine the identification
of the intentions subserving agents’ behavior . The objection can be answered,
in virtue of there being unique arrays of intensional parameters relative to which
each of the types of intention (modeled as modal operators) receive their value.
E.g., an agent can be said to act intentionally iff her ’intention-in-action’ re-
ceives a positive semantic value, where a necessary condition on the latter is
that there is at least one world in her epistemic modal space at which – relative
to a context of a particular time and location, which constrains the admissibil-
ity of her possible actions as defined at a first index, and which subsequently
constrains the outcome thereof as defined at a second index – the intention is
18The nature of the indeterminacy in question is examined in Hawthorne (2010). For a
thorough examination of approaches to the ontology of quantum mechanics, see Arntzenius
(2012: ch. 3).
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realized:
JIntenton-in-Action(φ)Kw = 1 only if ∃w’JφKw
′,c(=t,l),a,o = 1.
The agent’s intention to pursue a course of action at a future time – i.e., her
’intention-for-the-future’ – can receive a positive value only if there is a possible
world and a future time, relative to which the possibility that a state, φ, is
realized can be defined. Thus:
JIntention-for-the-future(φ)Kw = 1 only if ∃w’∀t∃t’[t< t’ ∧ JφKw
′,t′ = 1].
In the setting of epistemic logic, epistemic necessity can further be modeled
in a relational semantics encoding the property of knowledge, whereas epistemic
possibility might encode the property of belief (cf. Hintikka, 1962; Fagin et al.,
1995; Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995; Williamson, 2009; Khudairi, ms2). Finally,
Khudairi (ms3) treats Gödel’s (1953) conception of rational propositional intu-
ition as a modal operator in the setting of a bimodal, dynamic provability logic,
and demonstrates how – via correspondence theory – the notion of ’intuition-
of’, i.e. a property of awareness of one’s cognitive states, can be shown to
be formally equivalent to the notion of ’intuition-that’, i.e. a modal operator
concerning the value of the propositional state at issue.19
5 Objections and Replies
Dean (2016) raises two issues for a proposal similar to the foregoing, namely
that algorithms – broadly construed – can be defined via abstraction principles
19The correspondence results between modal propositional and first-order logic are advanced
in van Benthem (1983; 1984/2003) and Janin and Walukiewicz (1996). Availing of correspon-
dence theory in order to account for the relationship between the notions of ’intuition-of’ and
’intuition-that’ resolves an inquiry posed by Parsons (1993: 233). As a dynamic interpreta-
tional modality, rational intuition can further serve as a guide to possible reinterpretations
both of quantifier domains (cf. Fine, 2005) and of the extensions of mathematical vocab-
ulary such as the membership-relation (cf. Uzquiano, 2015). This provides an account of
Gödel’s (op. cit.; 1961) suggestion that rational intuition can serve as a guide to conceptual
elucidation.
12
which specify equivalence relations between implementations of computational
properties in isomorphic machines.20 Dean’s candidate abstraction principle
for algorithms as abstracts is: that the algorithm implemented by M1 = the
algorithm implemented by M2 iff M1 ≃M2.21 Both issues target the uniqueness
of the algorithm purported to be identified by the abstraction principle.
The first issue generalizes Benacerraf’s (1965) contention that, in the re-
duction of number theory to set theory, there must be, and is not, a princi-
pled reason for which to prefer the identification of natural numbers with von
Neumann ordinals (e.g., 2 = {∅,{∅}}), rather than with Zermelo ordinals (i.e.,
order-types of well-orderings).22 The issue is evinced by the choice of whether
to define algorithms as isomorphic iterations of state transition functions (cf.
Gurevich, 1999), or to define them as isomorphic recursions of functions which
assign values to a partially ordered set of elements (cf. Moschovakis, op. cit.).
Linnebo and Pettigrew (2014: 10) argue similarly that, for two ’non-rigid’ struc-
tures which admit of non-trivial automorphisms, one can define a graph which
belies their isomorphism. E.g., let an abstraction principle be defined for the
isomorphism between S and S*, such that
∀S,S*[AS = AS* iff 〈S, R1 . . . Rn〉 ≃ 〈S*, R*1 . . . R*n〉].
However, if there is a graph, G, such that:
S = {v1, v2}, and R = {〈v1, v2〉, 〈v2, v1〉},
then one can define an automorphism, f : G ≃ G, such that f(v1) = v2 and
20Fodor (2000: 105, n.4) and Piccinini (2004) note that the identification of mental states
with their functional roles ought to be distinguished from identifying those functional roles
with abstract computations. Conversely, a computational theory of mind need not be commit-
ted to the identification of abstract, computational operations with the functional organization
of a machine. Identifying abstract computational properties with the functional organization
of a creature’s mental states is thus a choice point, in theories of the nature of mental repre-
sentation.
21Cf. Moschovakis (1998).
22Cf. Zermelo (1908/1967) and von Neumann (1923/1967). Well-orderings are irreflexive,
transitive, binary relations on all non-empty sets, which define a least or distinguished element
in the sets.
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f(v2) = v1, such that S* = {v1} while R* = {〈v*1, v*1〉}. Then S* has one
element via the automorphism, while S has two. So, S and S* are not, after all,
isomorphic.
The second issue is that complexity is crucial to the identity criteria of
algorithms. Two algorithms might be isomorphic, while the decidability of one
algorithm is proportional to a deterministic polynomial function of the size of
its input – with k a member of the natural numbers, N, and TIME referring
to the relevant complexity class:
⋃
k∈NTIME(nk) – and the decidability of the
second algorithm will be proportional to a deterministic exponential function
of the size of its input –
⋃
k∈NTIME(2n
k
). The deterministic polynomial time
complexity class is a subclass of the deterministic exponential time complexity
class. However, there are problems decidable by algorithms only in polynomial
time (e.g., the problem of primality testing, such that, for any two natural
numbers, the numbers possess a greatest common divisor equal to 1), and only
in exponential time (familiarly from logic, e.g., the problem of satisfiability –
i.e., whether, for a given formula, there exists a model which can validate it –
and the problem of validity – i.e. whether a satisfiable formula is valid).23
Both issues can be treated by noting that Dean’s discussion targets abstrac-
tion principles for the very notion of a computable function, rather than for
abstraction principles for cognitive computational properties. It is a virtue of
homotopic abstraction principles for cognitive intensional functions that both
the temporal complexity class to which the functions belong, and the applica-
tions of the model, are subject to variation. Variance in the cognitive roles,
for which Epistemic Modal Algebra provides a model, will crucially bear on
the nature of the representational properties unique to the interpretation of the
23For further discussion, see Dean (2015).
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intensional functions at issue. Thus, e.g., when the internal representations in
the Language of Thought – as modeled by Epistemic Modal Algebra – subserve
perceptual representational states, then their contents will be individuated by
both the computational constancies at issue and the external, environmental
properties – e.g., the properties of lightness and distance – of the perceiver.24 A
further virtue of the foregoing is that variance in the coding of Epistemic Modal
Algebras – i.e. in the types of information over which the intensional functions
will be defined – by constrast to a restriction of the Language of Thought to
mathematical languages such as Peano arithmetic, permits homotopic abstrac-
tion principles to circumvent the Burali-Forti paradox for implicit definitions
based on isomorphism.25
The examples of instances of Epistemic Modal Algebra – witnessed by the
possible worlds models in Bayesian perceptual psychology, linguistics, quantum
information theory, and philosophy of mind – provide abductive support for the
existence of the intensional functions specified in homotopic abstraction princi-
ples. The philosophical significance of independent, abductive support for the
existence of epistemic modalities in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science
is that the latter permits a circumvention of the objections to the abstractionist
foundations of number theory that have accrued since its contemporary founding
(cf. Wright, 1983). Eklund (2006) suggests, e.g., that the existence of the ab-
stract objects which are the referents of numerical term-forming operators might
need to be secured, prior to assuming that the abstraction principle for cardinal
number is true. While Hale and Wright (2009) maintain, in response, that the
truth of the relevant principles will be prior to the inquiry into whether the terms
24The computational properties at issue can also be defined over non-propositional infor-
mation states, such as cognitive maps possessed of geometric rather than logical structure.
See, e.g., O’Keefe and Nadel (1978); Camp (2007); and Rescorla (2009).
25Cf. Burali-Forti (1897/1967). Hodes (1984) and Hazen (1985) note that abstraction
principles based on isomorphism with unrestricted comprehension entrain the paradox.
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defined therein refer, they provide a preliminary endorsement of an ’abundant’
conception of properties, according to which identifying the sense of a predi-
cate will be sufficient for predicate reference.26 One aspect of the significance
of empirical and philosophical instances of models of Epistemic Modal Algebra
is thus that, by providing independent, abductive support for the truth of the
homotopic abstraction principles for cognitive algorithms, the proposal remains
neutral on the status of ’sparse’ versus ’abundant’ conceptions of properties.27
Another aspect of the philosophical significance of possible worlds semantics
being availed of in Bayesian vision science, empirical linguistics, and quantum
information theory, is that it belies the purportedly naturalistic grounds for
Quine’s (1963/1976) scepticism of de re modality.
A final objection derives from the work of Azzouni (2013: 9.1-9.2; forthcom-
ing). Azzouni (op. cit.) argues for a position which he refers to as ’quantifier
neutralism’, according to which the truth-conditions for quantifiers are suffi-
cient for identifying the latter, without requiring reference to domains. Thus,
reference to the purported domains over which quantifiers range is a superfluous
and misleading metaphor. On this approach, the truth-conditions for quantifiers
will be theory-relative. In the absence of objects comprising domains over which
the quantifiers are purported to range, there is thus no reason to believe that
the truth-conditions in mathematical and scientific theories are ontologically-
committing. He suggests, then, that the explanation of the belief that there are
objects derives from the ’involuntary’ perception thereof (forthcoming: 282).
The experience as of objects is then attributed to ’internal cognitive mecha-
26For identity conditions on abundant properties – where the domain of properties, in the
semantics of second-order logic, is a subset of the domain of objects, and the properties are
definable in a metalanguage by predicates whose satisfaction-conditions have been fixed –
see Hale (2013). For a generalization of the abundant conception, such that the domain of
properties is isomorphic to the powerset of the domain of objects, see Cook (2014).
27Cf. Rayo (2003: 318).
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nisms’ (286; see also pp. 8-9, 264, and the remainder of section 7.5).28
Azzouni’s suggestion that there are ’internal cognitive mechanisms’ subserv-
ing apparent object perception might betray an ontological commitment to there
being abstracta; namely, the intensional, cognitive computational properties
countenanced in Bayesian perceptual psychology. Azzouni (op. cit.: 7.8 - 7.9)
anticipates and endeavors to counter the foregoing reply, by noting that the
optimality of theories proffered in logic, metaphysics, and the natural sciences
requires no commitment to the existence of the entities mentioned therein.
Azzouni’s argument against the existence of objects – concreta and abstracta
alike – hinges on the individuation-conditions for quantifiers. He argues, as
noted, that objectual, first-order quantifiers can be defined via metalinguistic
truth-conditions (op. cit.: 10). The metalinguistic truth-conditions take, e.g.,
the form: ∃x.(Px) iff ∃X.δX (op. cit.). However, the foregoing theory of quan-
tification is unduly restrictive. For example, the truth-condition for probability
quantifiers is given by the formula:
(Px ≥ r)[φx],
where x is a bound second-order variable; P(x) encodes the probability that
the set {x:φx} is less than or equal to r; r is an element of the intersection
between a subset of hereditarily countable sets and the real interval, [0,1]; and
the quantifier, (Px ≥ r), is closed under finite conjunctions and disjunctions
[cf. Keisler (1985: 509-510); Barwise and Feferman (1985: 507)]. Crucially, the
metalinguistic truth-condition for probability quantifiers makes explicit refer-
ence to the real numbers.29 The claim, then, that quantifiers can be defined
28For an examination of the psychological mechanisms necessary for object-perception, see,
inter alia, Treisman and Gelade (1980); Spelke and Kinzler (2007); and Scholl and Flombaum
(2010).
29Note that, by contrast to Field’s (1980/2016: 55-56) approach, Azzouni’s eschewal of
ontological commitment to concrete objects would preclude redefining the reals as relations
of betweeness and congruence on points of spacetime.
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without reference to domains of objects does not generalize. So, if ontological
commitment is generally to be eschewed of, the argument must proceed via a
different means.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this essay, the equivalence relations countenanced in Homotopy Type The-
ory were availed of, in order to specify an abstraction principle for intensional,
computational properties. The homotopic abstraction principle for intensional
mental functions provides an epistemic conduit into our knowledge of cogni-
tive algorithms as abstract objects. Because intensional functions in Epistemic
Modal Algebra are deployed as core models in the philosophy of mind, Bayesian
visual psychology, natural language semantics, and quantum information the-
ory, there is independent abductive support for the truth of homotopic ab-
straction. Epistemic modality may thereby be recognized as both a compelling
and a materially adequate candidate for the fundamental structure of mental
representational states, and as thus comprising a fragment of the Language of
Thought.
18
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